Articles of the month: Aug 2020

Articles of the month Hits: 270
The most interesting and important papers on the crisis anthropology and the adjacent areas in June 2020

Abstract

This study provides an empirical analysis of 79 official ISIS English-language videos and uses Quentin Skinner’s analytical approach to examine the prevalence of and changes in the speech acts used in the videos. The results show that directive, expressive, and assertive were the most common classes of speech acts and that threatening speech acts were featured most prominently. This study concludes that the fundamental semantic intention of the videos is to mobilise the addressees to align with the group’s demands and the video might serve more than simply recruitment, but as a diplomatic/negotiating tool for real-world events that ISIS faces.

Abstract

Boko Haram videos are among the only windows into the group leadership’s ideology. However, previous studies of Boko Haram videos treated the group monolithically and neither distinguished between internal factions nor analyzed cinematographic settings in each faction’s videos. At a time when the two groups known as Boko Haram–Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jamaat Ahlussunnah lid-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS)–rival each other and combat Nigerian and subregional military forces, this article argues it is imperative to examine factions’ contrasting self-presentations in videos. While one faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi revealed combat skill and lectured about an Islamic state, another faction led by Abubakar Shekau revealed veneration of Shekau, masses of worshippers in group territories, and imposing sharia punishments. Even when these factions were nominally unified, they still produced media separately and competed to control communications to Islamic State. Another Boko Haram breakaway group called Ansaru also influenced Boko Haram videos after some members reintegrated into Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s faction. This article demonstrates how in jihadist groups the one wielding the camera also wields power and how jihadist videos can facilitate understanding a group’s internal dynamics.

Abstract

The concept of “apocalyptic terrorism” has become common in the study of terrorism since the turn of the millennium and some have made considerable claims about its analytical and practical utility. However, it raises substantial problems. Following a brief survey of the way that the idea has been employed, this paper identifies difficulties inherent in its current use. In addition to those of a definitional kind, these include the treatment of “apocalyptic” as a synonym for “religious”; the assumption that apocalyptic is always primary and totalizing; homogenizing claims about the character of apocalyptic radicalism; mistaken assumptions about the causes and character of apocalyptic violence; problematic cross-cultural and non-religious applications of the term “apocalyptic”; the neglect of hermeneutics; and the dearth of contributions by specialists in the study of religion. The argument concludes that there are good grounds for abandoning the notion of “apocalyptic terrorism” entirely, but given that this is unlikely, it should be employed far more cautiously, and a narrower, more tightly defined understanding of the concept should be advocated by those engaged in the study of terrorism.

Abstract

In the context of the global jihadist mobilization triggered by the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2012 and the subsequent emergence of Islamic State, child and adolescent recruitment has reached unprecedented levels in Spain. Between 2013 and 2019, 44 jihadists were arrested in this country due to their involvement in the indoctrination and recruitment of individuals below 18 years of age. How did they carry out the mobilization of minors in support of global jihadism? Adopting a qualitative approach guided by grounded theory methods to address the question, this article relies on evidence collected mostly from primary sources (police reports, criminal proceedings, court hearings, as well as semi-structured interviews with police experts and front-line practitioners). The results indicate that their radicalization strategies varied as a function of the existence of previous personal ties between the recruiter and the minor; the age of the minor; and the environment in which the process unfolded. The interaction of these three factors generates the outline of three different formulas used in Spain for jihadist indoctrination of underage youth: one unfolds within the family milieu, another within the immediate social environment and a third via cyberspace.

Abstract

How do government protections, and violations, of its citizens’ civil liberties influence the country's exposure to terrorism? Existing research remains divided. We contribute clarity to these debates by examining the distinct effects of specific types of civil liberties: physical integrity (e.g., freedom from extra-judicial torture and killing), political liberties (e.g., freedom of expression and assembly), and private liberties (e.g., freedom of thought and religion and property rights). We distinguish these civil liberties dimensions from the role of institutions for political selection (e.g., elections) and horizontal accountability (e.g., checks and balances, executive constraints). We argue physical integrity rights decrease terrorism, by reducing grievances against and increasing trust in the state, while political liberties increase terrorism, by both incentivizing violence among those with extremist goals and protecting their ability to organize. Empirically, we measure a country's exposure to terrorism using the Global Terrorism Database. We isolate the effects of government actions on these civil liberties dimensions from each other, and from the effects of the state's political institutions, by leveraging the Varieties of Democracy data. Our sample covers 177 states from 1970 to 2018. We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses regarding the effects of the distinct component dimensions of civil liberties.

Executive summary/Abstract

Background

In the field of terrorism research, the violent radicalisation of individuals towards perpetrating acts of terror has been the subject of academic enquiry for some time. One core focus by social scientists has been the role of narratives in this process. Narratives have the ability to present a socially constructed version of reality which serves the interest of the narrator(s). In the context of terrorism, by depicting violence as a viable antidote to individual vulnerabilities, the narratives purported for propagandistic purposes have the potential to thwart perceptions of instrumentality (a key characteristic of violent radicalisation). In order to prevent this from happening, researchers and counter‐terrorism practitioners have increasingly sought to explore the potential for counter‐narratives; targeted interventions that challenge the rationalisation(s) of violence purported in dominant narratives which, in turn, reconstructs the story. However, there is overwhelming consensus in both government and academic spheres that the concept of the counter‐narrative is underdeveloped and, to date, there has been no synthesis of its effectiveness at targeting violent radicalisation‐related outcomes.

Objectives

The objective of this review was to provide a synthesis of the effectiveness of counter‐narratives in reducing the risk of violent radicalisation.

Search Methods

After a scoping exercise, the literature was identified through four search stages, including key‐word searches of 12 databases, hand searches of reference lists of conceptual papers or books on the topic of counter‐narratives, as well as direct contact with experts and professional agencies in the field.

Selection Criteria

Studies adopting an experimental or quasiexperimental design where at least one of the independent variables involved comparing a counter‐narrative to a control (or comparison exposure) were included in the review.

Data Collection and Analysis

Accounting for duplicates, a total of 2,063 records were identified across two searches. Nineteen studies across 15 publications met the inclusion criteria. These studies were largely of moderate quality and 12 used randomised control trial designs with varying types of controls. The publication years ranged from 2000 to 2018, with the majority of studies published after 2015. The studies represented a range of geographical locations, but the region most heavily represented was North America. In most cases, the dominant narrative(s) “to‐be‐countered” comprised of hostile social constructions of an adversary or “out‐group”. The majority of studies challenged these dominant narratives through the use of stereotype‐challenging, prosocial, or moral “exemplars”. Other techniques included the use of alternative accounts, inoculation and persuasion.

Results

In terms of risk factors for violent radicalisation, there was some disparity on intervention effectiveness. Overall, when pooling all outcomes, the intervention showed a small effect. However, the observed effects varied across different risk factors. Certain approaches (such as counter‐stereotypical exemplars) were effective at targeting realistic threat perceptions, in‐group favouritism and out‐group hostility. However, there was no clear reduction in symbolic threat perceptions or implicit bias. Finally, there was a sparse yet discouraging evidence on the effectiveness of counter‐narrative interventions at targeting primary outcomes related to violent radicalisation, such as intent to act violently.

Authors' Conclusions

The review contributes to existing literature on violent radicalisation‐prevention, highlighting the care and complexity needed to design and evaluate narrative‐based interventions which directly counter existing, dominant narratives. The authors note the challenges of conducting high‐quality research in the area, but nonetheless encourage researchers to strive for experimental rigour within these confines

Abstract

Terrorist attacks carried out by individuals have significantly accelerated over the last twenty years. This type of lone-actor (LA) terrorism stands as one of the greatest security threats of our time. While the research on LA behavior and characteristics has produced valuable information on demographics, classifications, and warning signs, the relationship among these characteristics is yet to be addressed. Moreover, the means of radicalization and attacking have changed over decades. This study conducts an a-posteriori analysis of the temporal changes in LA terrorism and behavioral associations in LAs. We initially identify twenty-five binary behavioral characteristics of LAs and analyze 190 LAs. Next, we classify LAs according to ideology first, incident-scene behavior (determined via a virtual attacker-defender game) secondly, and, finally, the clusters obtained from the data. In addition, within each class, statistically significant associations and temporal relations are extracted using the A-priori algorithm. These associations would be instrumental in identifying the attacker’s type and intervening at the right time. The results indicate that while pre-9/11 LAs were mostly radicalized by the people in their environment, post-9/11 LAs are more diverse. Furthermore, association chains for different LA types present unique characteristic pathways to violence and after-attack behavior.

Abstract

Originality/Value – Popular accounts characterize deradicalization in a simplistic, binary fashion – they are judged to be either effective or ineffective. The current reality is consistent with some of the earliest conceptual discussion – that is, deradicalization programs do not offer a one-size fits all solution, they cannot work for everyone, and they are of immense practical benefit in some cases. The authors’ fundamental argument is that deradicalization initiatives warrant continued investment.

Abstract

A detailed case study of a Portuguese Islamic State network with strong connections to the United Kingdom sheds significant light on the foreign fighter recruitment pipeline between Europe and Syria. Several of the men involved in the network made two trips to Syria. On January 9, 2013, British authorities informed their Portuguese counterparts that at least two Portuguese citizens were involved in the (first) kidnapping of British journalist John Cantlie in Syria. That information opened a seven-year investigation, recently closed, in which the Portuguese Judiciary Police were able to follow in real time the preparations, contacts, and final travel to Syria of a group of Islamist extremists, including their wives and children, who would join what became the Islamic State. Investigators established how they financed themselves through the creation of fictitious applications for student loans and welfare benefits in the United Kingdom. They used that money to travel but also to recruit and help young British extremists make their way into Syria, using Lisbon as transit point. But investigators were not able to shut down the pipeline because foreign fighter travel would only become a crime under Portuguese law in 2015, underlining the importance of such legislation. Several members of the network are presumed dead, while others face trial in Portugal. The most senior alleged member of the network, Nero Saraiva, was transferred from Syria to Iraq where he could face trial or extradition to Portugal. Saraiva allegedly became close to the Islamic State group known as the “Beatles” and appears to have had advanced knowledge of the execution of the American journalist James Foley.

Intro:

The coronavirus pandemic has slowed global travel across the board. Countries around the world have cut down on air traffic, enforced quarantine measures for arriving travelers and blacklisted other countries from inbound travel. With all the heightened restrictions, many analysts predicted that one demographic in particular would be negatively impacted: foreign terrorist fighters, individuals who travel from their countries of residence or nationality to join terrorist organizations abroad. The pandemic has also highlighted the dedication, resourcefulness and continued threat posed by some extremists who are dead set on traveling to participate in jihadist organizations...