Articles of the month: Feb 2021

Understanding how extremist Salafists communicate, and not only what, is key to gaining insights into the ways they construct their social order and use psychological forces to radicalize potential sympathizers on social media. With a view to contributing to the existing body of research which mainly focuses on terrorist organizations, we analyzed accounts that advocate violent jihad without supporting (at least publicly) any terrorist group and hence might be able to reach a large and not yet radicalized audience. We constructed a critical multimodal and multidisciplinary framework of discourse patterns that may work as potential triggers to a selection of key cognitive biases and we applied it to a corpus of Facebook posts published by seven extremist Salafists. Results reveal how these posts are either based on an intense crisis construct (through negative outgroup nomination, intensification and emotion) or on simplistic solutions composed of taken-for-granted statements. Devoid of any grey zone, these posts do not seek to convince the reader; polarization is framed as a presuppositional established reality. These observations reveal that extremist Salafist communication is constructed in a way that may trigger specific cognitive biases, which are discussed in the paper.

Many early published analyses of the terrorist placed psychopathy as the core explanatory variable for terrorist behaviour. This speculative opinion was derived mainly from popular culture, and the desire to attribute mental disorders to those committing such violent acts. Poor research designs and a lack of empiricism ultimately undermined these arguments in favour of terrorism being rooted in disorders of personality. Multiple studies supporting psychopathic and personality-level explanations were conducted in the absence of rigorous clinical diagnostic procedures. Despite the methodological issues, concluding remarks from this research continues to hold instinctive appeal across the research field. This incentivises a need for a rigorous synthesis of the evidence base. The objective of this systematic review is to assess the impact of personality upon attitudes, intentions, and behaviours in the context of radicalisation and terrorism. This paper follows the same systematic process as the Gill et al. paper in this special issue. However, we use the model to interrogate the existing empirical literature on personality and terrorism in terms of its coverage, common themes, methodological strengths and weaknesses and implications. The search strategy for the systematic review is based on the Campbell Collaboration method. Results and their implications are discussed.

On January 12, during an event at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered an address accusing Iran of being al Qaeda’s “new home base.” Pompeo alleged that after 30 years of cooperation, Iran and al Qaeda had taken their relationship to a new level in recent years. In 2015, Tehran supposedly “decided to allow al Qaeda to establish a new operational headquarters” on its territory and now the terrorist organization “is operating under the hard shell of the Iranian regime’s protection.”...

The article evaluates the current worsening security situation in Burkina Faso and ties it to a lack of state-building in the country. Based on Tilly's approach to state-building, it, consequently, draws a set of recommendations aiming to strengthen the effectiveness of Burkinabe security forces as a primary step to stop the current wave of violence and establish more stable state institutions. These would become a first step of the process that is necessary to stabilise the situation in the region, enhance the Pillars of State, and allow the state institutions to overcome the militias. The article clearly states that foreign intervention and military solution only of the conflict cannot lead to a successful result. Burkina Faso needs to enhance institutional penetration throughout its territory to allow for the mitigation of the rebellions not only in this instance but also for the future and strengthen the state-building project.

Music plays an important role in both the right-wing extremist and the Salafi jihadist scenes as a unifying and radicalizing factor. It is used to share propaganda and highlight specific ideologies. Music is disseminated by various means, e.g. via social media, and used strategically to attract potential new members. The aims of right-wing extremist music and the Salafi jihadist nasheeds are, among other things, to inspire the youth, reach out to a worldwide audience of potential sympathizers, and disseminate their absolutist worldview. To achieve these goals, seemingly objective depictions of negative everyday experiences, of oppression, and the need for resistance are utilized. The songs are usually associated with violent content, and in conjunction with videos, they illustrate the perceived need to defend oneself. In this article, we will take a closer look at the content of four selected extremist songs. Our analysis of the content is based on a triangulation of sequential text analysis methods and identifies the differences and comparable elements of the ideologies in a final step. In addition to the content, the research aims to examine the possible effects of extremist groups’ music.

In this research, we conduct a systematic comparative analysis of 366 stories extracted from English-language magazines by ISIS, Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) and the Taliban. We employ the Information, Motivation, and Behavior Skills (IMB) model of behavior change to conduct in-depth qualitative and quantitative analysis of these stories. By focusing on stories featured in jihadi magazines, this research illustrates that (1) stories of ‘average’ jihadists can be effective persuasive tools, (2) the majority of the content of stories by all groups falls within the motivational component of the IMB model and that, (3) groups differ in their focus on various element of the IMB. For example, while Al Qaeda stories provide more informational content, other groups focus on motivational rhetoric.

China’s domestic security policy and its growing international influence are fuelling jihadist animosity throughout Asia and beyond. Beijing’s crackdown in Xinjiang is the most commonly cited China-related grievance within global jihadist discourse and has gained traction in recent years, but there are additional narratives emerging about China’s foreign policy and its increasing presence in the Islamic world. Beijing is becoming markedly more assertive in pursuing its geopolitical ambitions and in securing its growing international interests. This has not gone unnoticed and the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and others have explicitly declared China an enemy. These groups perceive China as an imperial or colonial power that is actively expanding its political, economic, and military footprint abroad, supporting repressive governments, and exploiting natural resources. If China’s influence continues to grow and these perceptions continue to spread, the Asian giant could conceivably become a higher priority enemy for a broader range of elements within the global jihadist movement over time...

Foreign fighters can be both an asset and a liability for the groups to which they are recruited. While they can bring with them much sought after skills and resources, they can also create tensions between foreign fighter contingents and local membership. This paper considers Al-Shabaab’s relationship with foreign fighters from the group’s foundational years in the 1990s through to the infamous purge of 2011–2013. By examining Al-Shabaab’s history and narratives around foreign-ness and foreign fighters, this paper finds that foreign fighters have persistently influenced Al-Shabaab’s organizational cohesion and structural integrity.