Articles of the month: Mar 2021, part 2

A systematic review of the empirical literature on lone-actor terrorism, the first of its kind, is presented. Across 109 sources, ten main themes that characterize this domain are identified and described: definitions of lone-actor terrorism and typologies; heterogeneity of lone-actor terrorists; presence of mental health issues and/or personality disorders; similarities with other lone-offender criminal types; motivation to act driven by personal and ideological influences; increasing prominence of internet use; ties with other extremists, groups or wider movements; processes of attack planning and preparation; role of opportunity/triggers; and a tendency toward leakage/attack signaling.

Studies on the psychology of terrorism and fundamentalism place great importance on the role of groups, with a central concept of “us” versus “them.” The present study examines how and why Salafi-jihadist groups in the Middle East have attracted typical citizens. The participants in this qualitative study were unremarkable Kurdish people living near the western borders of Iran with an allegiance toward Salafi-jihadist groups. We selected 12 people for the purposes of this study. Findings indicate that “group adaptation” and “rejection of the other” are the two overarching themes pointed out by the participants. Group adaptation included four sub-themes: (a) Idealization of, plus identification and assimilation with the leader, (b) developing strong group bonds, (c) direct and nonhierarchical agency of the individual in the group, and (d) group hypnotic suggestion. The “rejection of the other” included two sub-themes: (a) in-group rejection (reducing legitimate Islam to Salafism) and (b) out-group rejection (rejection of non-Muslims). The results of the study highlight the importance of a sense of belonging to the group in the process of recruitment and assimilation of individuals into jihadist groups. Findings also indicate that the concepts of adaptation and rejection play a pivotal role in the formation of fundamentalist Salafi-jihadist groups and resultant violence. We discuss the implications of group analysis for possible ways to counterterrorism.

In recent years, extremists have increasingly turned to online spaces to distribute propaganda and as a recruitment tool. While there is a clear need for governments and social media companies to respond to these efforts, such responses also bring with them a set of ethical challenges. This paper provides an ethical analysis of key policy responses to online extremist propaganda. It identifies the ethical challenges faced by policy responses and details the ethical foundations on which such policies can potentially be justified in a modern liberal democracy. We also offer an ethical framework in which policy responses to online extremism in liberal democracies can be grounded, setting clear parameters upon which future policies can be built in a fast-changing online environment.

The Islamic Movement of Sudan established the first Islamist regime in the Sunni Islamic world by a military coup. By seising state power, the Islamic Movement tried to overhaul the political system of Sudan. However, what it brought to the politics of Sudan was far from what its leader Hasan al-Turabi envisioned. It was largely due to the failure of the Islamic Movement to institutionalise its control over state power, originating from its design to conceal the nature of the coup which prevented it from claiming the official leadership of the state. The military Islamists leading the coup continued to run the state publicly. The institutions of the Islamic Movement itself were weakened in the process, making it more difficult to lay the national politics on an institutional foundation. The division and conflicts among the Islamists could not be solved in an institutional framework, leading to the split of the Islamic Movement. The Islamists were further fragmented after the split, both within and without the regime, opening the gate for factional politics.

This article explores the Taliban’s insurgency (2007–2009) in Swat Valley (northern Pakistan) and the multiple meanings of violence in this context. A thematic analysis of data collected through qualitative fieldwork finds that the violence experienced by the victims was understood in three ways: physically as bodily harm, psychologically as terror and fear, and socially in the form of humiliation and dishonor. By delving into the experiences of civilians, the article offers a victim-centered approach and argues that instances of violence were characterized by harm as a “core referent.” It further argues for a context-specific understanding of harm and explicates that this notion is also determined by the local culture of Swat Valley, Pashtunwali.

Drawing upon interviews and a variety of newspapers and other media associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement, this article analyses historic developments in its strategy for the Islamization of the now independent region of southern Sudan with particular reference to the experience of members of the movement from that region. It identifies significant parallels between the colonial and Islamist designs for “civilizing” southern Sudanese, arguing that like its colonial predecessor the “Civilizational Project” of Hasan al-Turabi’s “Salvation Regime” alternated between assimilating and excluding them. The post-1989 Islamist regime’s treatment of Islamist southerners before and after the secession of the south in 2011 highlighted the division between these assimilationist and exclusionary trends. Although the movement was largely unsuccessful in recruiting southern members, those who did join were not simply Islamist satellites – like Islamists from the other marginalized regions, they sought to use the Movement to traverse the social divide between center and periphery, sometimes in a manner that challenged the riverain elites that dominated it. In thus deconstructing the notion that Islamic movements are ideologically and socially homogenous, the article contributes a fresh perspective on the debate about Arabization and Islamization in Sudan as well as center–periphery relations in post-colonial contexts.

In 2012, several Jihadi armed groups stormed the northern part of Mali and became the unchallenged rulers of two-thirds of the country. Each group governed based on Islamic Law, codifying violence against their enemies in combat and the populations they controlled. Despite drawing on similar jihadist ideology, these governing systems differed significantly in their uses of violence and jurisprudence. What explains the emergence and legitimization of such contrasting norms? We compare patterns of violence and restraint in the regions of Kidal and Gao based on interviews with diverse protagonists of the occupation, including former members of Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In Kidal, the Ansar Dine commander’s decision to follow local Islamic jurisprudence limited violence. In contrast, MUJAO rule over Gao used forms of punishment encompassing physical violence to assert political hegemony despite opposition from influential local imams and youth movements. Figures among the noncombatant population also influenced the formation and interpretation of norms among these groups, though less so under strong military imperatives. The findings highlight the importance of searching for a common language over norms of government between insurgents and populations as a key source of restraint.

Relations between religion and nationalism, as two identity forms, has been debated in Muslim countries, especially where the nationalist trends coincided with the rise of religious reformation and Pan-Islamic movements. This article scrutinizes discourses on linking a transnational ideology of Pan-Islamism with Afghan nationalism in an early twentieth century nationalist newspaper, Seraj-ul Akhbar. The newspaper presents a unique case for this study since it was a platform for dissemination of both ideologies simultaneously. Unlike the later Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals and Muhammad Iqbal, Seraj-ul Akhbar authors did not see a contradiction between Pan-Islamism and territorial nationalism. They formulated a universal Muslim unity going through the national state structure, but not bypassing them. Meanwhile, Seraj-ul Akhbar appropriated the religious language for strengthening national unity. In this way, nationalistic and Pan-Islamic concepts were used to craft a nationally stable identity. It is argued that Pan-Islamism is not a unitary universal transnational ideology, rather it is often embedded in different national, language, and ethnic boundaries.

This article reflects on two core issues of human subjects’ research ethics and how they play out for online extremism and terrorism researchers. Medical research ethics, on which social science research ethics are based, centers the protection of research subjects, but what of the protection of researchers? Greater attention to researcher safety, including online security and privacy and mental and emotional wellbeing, is called for herein. Researching hostile or dangerous communities does not, on the other hand, exempt us from our responsibilities to protect our research subjects, which is generally ensured via informed consent. This is complicated in data-intensive research settings, especially with the former type of communities, however. Also grappled with in this article therefore are the pros and cons of waived consent and deception and the allied issue of prevention of harm to subjects in online extremism and terrorism research. The best path forward it is argued—besides talking through the diversity of ethical issues arising in online extremism and terrorism research and committing our thinking and decision-making around them to paper to a much greater extent than we have done to-date—may be development of ethics guidelines tailored to our sub-field.

Studies on the psychology of terrorism and fundamentalism place great importance on the role of groups, with a central concept of “us” versus “them.” The present study examines how and why Salafi-jihadist groups in the Middle East have attracted typical citizens. The participants in this qualitative study were unremarkable Kurdish people living near the western borders of Iran with an allegiance toward Salafi-jihadist groups. We selected 12 people for the purposes of this study. Findings indicate that “group adaptation” and “rejection of the other” are the two overarching themes pointed out by the participants. Group adaptation included four sub-themes: (a) Idealization of, plus identification and assimilation with the leader, (b) developing strong group bonds, (c) direct and nonhierarchical agency of the individual in the group, and (d) group hypnotic suggestion. The “rejection of the other” included two sub-themes: (a) in-group rejection (reducing legitimate Islam to Salafism) and (b) out-group rejection (rejection of non-Muslims). The results of the study highlight the importance of a sense of belonging to the group in the process of recruitment and assimilation of individuals into jihadist groups. Findings also indicate that the concepts of adaptation and rejection play a pivotal role in the formation of fundamentalist Salafi-jihadist groups and resultant violence. We discuss the implications of group analysis for possible ways to counterterrorism.

In research on terrorism and political violence, “fieldwork” now means many things. Scholars conduct interviews online, meet former extremists in urban centers, and travel across the globe to interview ex-combatants. But in this world of social media and constant connectivity, it is no longer possible to fully leave the “field.” Complicating matters is that researchers often do not speak openly about the ethical dilemmas they face—both during and after fieldwork—fearing it might damage their credibility. While various scholars have explored the ethical complexities of fieldwork in conflict-affected areas, there has been little discussion in political science on ethical challenges after fieldwork, and even less on how these post-fieldwork experiences are often highly gendered. Once fieldwork is over, what challenges do researchers face, what are researchers’ obligations to participants, and what types of regulations guide this behavior—especially when participants are former violent actors? What are the power dynamics between researchers and participants, how does gender affect these dynamics, and how do these relationships guide future interactions? For example, how do researchers deal with post-fieldwork requests for money or assistance? And how do scholars decide what to publish, and when, if they have received threats, or if threats to their participants change? Based on my experiences conducting over hundred interviews across Colombia, this paper argues that ethical review processes lack adequate consideration of ongoing ethical issues after fieldwork in conflict-affected environments, especially regarding contact with former insurgents. In addition, I argue that the tension between demands for transparency and adequately protecting both participants and researchers creates a disincentive to have open conversations about these dilemmas—especially among junior scholars.

While research on interstate rivalries is abundant, scholarship examining nonstate rivalries remains limited. To address this shortcoming, in this article we introduce the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD) – a dataset which captures dyadic rivalries and militarised disputes among armed nonstate actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) between 1993 and 2018. We begin by explaining why fine-grained data on militarised interactions between armed nonstate organisations are needed for a comprehensive understanding of conflict. We then provide details of the data collection process and coding practices. Finally, we identify the contributions that ANARD can make to conflict research.

Though existing research on religiously motivated terrorism has examined the characteristics of groups across religious traditions, very few have disaggregated their studies to the level of sect. Sectarian differences in conceptualizing world views and group membership may have a substantial impact on the framing rhetoric and behaviors of religiously motivated terrorist groups. This study investigates whether Islamist terrorist groups belonging to different sects display different organizational goals and mobilization and recruitment strategies. This study employs a text analysis of over 400 news articles for 40 Salafi and Shia organizations to analyze rhetorical patterns in diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames. The results suggest that the rhetoric, goal structures, and collective action frames terrorist groups employ differ systematically based on sect affiliation. These results speak to the importance of ideology and religious doctrine in influencing the threats, the recommended actions, and the motivational methods of terrorist organizations. Though these ideologies do not necessarily spark violence, they do drive variation in goal structures of those groups who use violence to affect political change.

The topic of hijra is very much present in the ideological messages of IslamicState and Al Qaeda as well as in many studies exploring why and how people are motivated to join the violent struggles in Syria. Yet, with a few exceptions, many studies mention hijra as something self-evident without exploring the meanings attached to hijra among the volunteers who joined Al Qaeda and/or IS. Based upon ethnographic work among Dutch Islamic militant activists of the Behind Bars network constituting a very vocal early contingent of male Syria volunteers, this article explores the meanings of hijra. I will show that ideas about hijra were essential to the construction of their departure narratives and examine how hijra for them, in different and sometimes contradicting ways, became a pathway to an ethical and political transformation. One which was, at the same time, being instrumentalized to strengthen the very type of governance they tried to escape.